Registered identity
Every agent is a record: stable agent_id, role, Ed25519 key binding, creation date. No more guessing which process did what — the registry is the source of truth for who exists.
Enterprise · Agent Governance
Your agents have names, owners and an off switch.
By 2027 it’s fleets — and a fleet of anonymous processes is a liability. LeanCTX makes every agent a registered identity: unique, owned by a human, lifecycle-managed, attested and revocable — with every transition in the tamper-evident audit trail.
The model
Identity is who answers. Role is what runs.
Roles stay reusable permission profiles. Identity attaches accountability on top: agent_id, owner, status, key binding, attestation, heartbeat. Four properties make a fleet governable.
Owned, always
Registration without a human owner is rejected. Accountability is structural: every audit entry, every lifecycle event, every evidence bundle traces to a person who answers for the agent.
Revocable in one transaction
Suspend an agent, or offboard an owner and suspend their whole fleet atomically — each suspension individually audited. Decommissioning is final and writes the audit-closing entry.
Attested, honestly
Binary and role-config hashes at registration and every heartbeat. Drift surfaces immediately (exit code 3) — upgrade, config edit or tampering. We document what this does NOT protect against.
In practice
A fleet, five commands.
Everything is CLI-first and exit-code honest, so your pipelines and your monitoring can act on it.
$ lean-ctx agent register --id ci-reviewer-1 --role reviewer --owner alice@org
registered: ci-reviewer-1 (role reviewer, owner alice@org)
spiffe id: spiffe://org.example/agent/reviewer/ci-reviewer-1
$ lean-ctx agent heartbeat ci-reviewer-1 # liveness + drift; exit 3 on drift
$ lean-ctx agent offboard-owner alice@org --reason "left company"
suspended 2 agent(s): ci-coder-1, ci-reviewer-1
$ lean-ctx agent check ci-reviewer-1 # enforce-path decision point
ci-reviewer-1: DENIED — suspended: left company # exit 1Every transition writes a tamper-evident audit entry — registered, suspended, resumed, decommissioned are standardized event types (OCP Part 4), so identity history lands in your evidence bundles automatically. Full model and threat model: agent-identity docs.
Every agent registered. Every action auditable.
"What happens when someone leaves?"
Their agents stop. Mechanically. Owner offboarding suspends every active agent of that owner in one locked transaction — wired to your SCIM deprovisioning flow or run from the leaver checklist. Orphaned agents are the forgotten service accounts of the agent era; LeanCTX makes them structurally impossible.
What platform teams ask.
A role says what a process may do; an identity says who is accountable for it. With fleets, the questions that matter are operational: who owns this agent, when was it last alive, who switched it off and why, what happens to its permissions when its owner leaves? The registry answers them mechanically — identity (who) stays separate from role (what), so roles remain reusable profiles.
An agent whose human owner left the company but which keeps running with its credentials — the agent-era version of the forgotten service account, except it reads code and runs commands. LeanCTX closes it structurally: owners are mandatory at registration, and one command (or your SCIM deprovisioning flow) suspends an owner’s entire active fleet in a single locked transaction, every suspension audited.
active → suspended ⇄ active → decommissioned. Suspension carries a reason and is reversible; decommissioning is final by design — the record is never deleted and never reactivated, because the identity is part of the audit history. Every transition writes a tamper-evident audit entry using standardized event types (agent_registered, agent_suspended, agent_resumed, agent_decommissioned — OCP Part 4), so identity changes show up in evidence bundles automatically.
Registration and every heartbeat hash the running binary and the active role file. A changed hash means something changed — an upgrade, a config edit, or tampering — and surfaces as drift with a non-zero exit code your monitoring can alert on. It is drift detection, not remote attestation: an attacker with full host control can fake hashes, and our threat model says so explicitly. It complements, not replaces, host hardening and code signing.
Three hooks. SPIFFE: every record maps to spiffe://<trust-domain>/agent/<role>/<agent_id>, so K8s workload identity (SPIRE) and the LeanCTX identity are the same name. SCIM: wire your deprovisioning flow to the owner-offboarding call. Enforce mode: the check API is a single decision point — unregistered or suspended agents are denied; start in monitor mode, switch to enforce once the fleet is registered.
Govern theagent workforce.
Register your first agent in a minute, locally and free — or talk to us about fleet rollout with SCIM and SPIFFE in the loop.